Frans Timmermans' appointment last November as First
Vice-President of the Commission in charge inter alia of the Rule of Law suggests that the issue of ensuring a more effective monitoring of EU countries' adherence to this principle will not fade from the Commission's agenda. This is indeed the first time that a Commissioner has been explicitly tasked to coordinate the Commission's work in this area. It is also worth noting that prior to his appointment, Timmermans had welcomed the Commission's rule of law communication on the ground that a more systematic approach was required to avoid any 'rule of law backsliding' post EU accession. [5] One may therefore hope that the Commission, which is now presided by Jean-Claude Juncker, will seriously consider activating its new rule of law framework whose rationale and main features are analysed below. This paper will however argue that the Commission's 'light-touch' proposal falls short of what is required to effectively address threats to the rule of law within the EU but is nevertheless preferable to the Council's alternative proposal to hold an annual rule of law dialogue.
THE COMMISSION'S DIAGNOSIS
The rationale underlying the Commission's new mechanism is that the current EU legal framework is ill designed when it comes to addressing internal, systemic threats to the rule of law and more generally, EU values.
This has become a significant issue to the extent that rule of law related crises appear to have gained both on intensity and regularity in the past decade. 
An increasing number of challenges to the rule of law

An inadequate framework to address the ongoing challenges to the rule of law
To suggest the introduction of a new mechanism implicitly assumes that the EU's current 'toolbox' is not adequate to address the previously described challenges. And indeed, the former President of the European Commission himself called for a 'better developed set of instruments ' [9] that would fill the space that exists at present between the Commission's infringement powers laid down in Articles 258-260 TFEU, and the so-called 'nuclear option ' [10] laid down in Article 7 TEU. Indeed, as will be shown below, both procedures suffer from a number of shortcomings, with the consequence that Article 7 TEU has never been used whereas the Commission's infringement powers have proved ineffective to remedy systemic violations of EU values.
The 'Nuclear Option'
The so-called 'nuclear option' is to be found in Article Unsurprisingly, while there have been many calls for activating Article 7 TEU, not least when it was revealed that several EU Member States and some candidate countries colluded in the running of secret CIA prisons after 9/11, [12] this provision has never been used for essentially two reasons: the thresholds for activating it are virtually impossible to satisfy and the existence of a political convention whereby it would be politically counterproductive to do so. Crucially, the provision was not even used in the case of the Austrian crisis which followed the elevation to government of the extremeright FPÖ party ten years ago.
With the sole exception of the original rule of law mechanism put in place for Romania and Bulgaria, which owes its specificity to the pre-accession context of preparing these countries for EU membership. Upholding the Rule of Law in the EU: On the Commission's 'Pre-Article 7 Procedure' as a Timid Step in the Right Direction Upholding the Rule of Law in the EU: On the Commission's 'Pre-Article 7 Procedure' as a Timid Step in the Right Direction system ceases to be governed by the rule of law. In addition to these negative externalities, any country disregarding the rule of law threatens the exercise of the rights granted to all EU citizens regardless of where they reside in the EU. Finally, the legitimacy and credibility of the EU are both undermined when it ceases to be able to guarantee internal compliance with the values it has sought to uphold and promote in its external relations.
The Commission had therefore a point when it noted that 'the confidence of all EU citizens and national authorities in the legal systems of all other Member
States is vital for the functioning of the whole EU'. [21] This may justify in turn an increased monitoring and policing of its Member States and the adoption of a new framework to more effectively safeguard the rule of law within the EU.
THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL
In a nutshell, the Commission's new framework to strengthen the rule of law takes the form of an early warning tool whose primary aim is to enable the Commission to enter into a structured dialogue with the Member State concerned to prevent the escalation of systemic threats to the rule of law. This procedure is supposed to precede the eventual triggering of the so-called nuclear option laid down in Article 7 TEU.
The Commission has also made clear that its proposed framework should not be understood as preventing the concurrent launch of infringement actions against the relevant Member State where specific violations of EU law can be identified.
Triggering factors
Before describing how the new 'rule of law dialogue' is supposed to work in practice, one must note the There is also a degree of confusion between the notions of systemic threat and systemic violation, which is crucial in the context of the proposal. It is difficult to understand if this new recourse to the notion of systemic threat is meant to signal a different substantive test or whether it should simply be understood as broadly synonymous with the notion of 'serious and persistent breach' currently mentioned by Article 7 TEU. This is an important issue as the Commission's proposed mechanism has been described as a new pre-Article 7 TEU procedure as will be shown below.
One may finally note that despite Barroso's call to 
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Conference, European Parliament, Strasbourg, 11 March 2014. Upholding TFEU. This assessment is not however unanimously shared. To give a single example, the Council's legal service has expressed its opposition to the Commission's proposal, alleging, to oversimplify, an unlawful powergrab by the Commission.
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[37] As will be shown below, this is however only one of the arguments that have been raised against the Commissions' suggested rule of law framework, the most significant of which will be reviewed below.
CRITICAL OVERVIEW
Before offering a critical albeit brief overview of Commission's proposal, a number of positive features will be highlighted.
Positive features
The Commission's proposal undoubtedly boasts a handful of strong points on the substantive, competence and the procedural plane.
With respect to the substance of the Commission's new rule of law framework, the Commission should be commended for adopting a reliable sketch of the core meaning of the rule of law and the main elements contained within it. This was by no means an easy task considering the multiple and at times, conflicting and problematic definitions of the rule of law which one may easily encounter in academic scholarship. The Commission's main concrete proposition also departs from the most widely discussed proposals that have been made prior to the publication of its communication.
Before briefly explaining why the Commission was for the most part wise to do so, a succinct overview of these proposals from the most radical one to the least farreaching one is offered below: Space precludes any critical review of the above-
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Weak features
The Commission's proposed new rule of law framework seems to be well designed until one begins examining how effective it would be at remedying the diagnosis it offers. It is in the context of the proposal's effectiveness that the main weakness of the proposal lies, potentially annihilating all the positive points made about it.
To begin with, the proposal is based on a presumption You can read all of our publications on our site :
www.robert-schuman.eu or no other compromise could perhaps be found within an institution which represents the Member States.
What is particularly ironic that the Council adopted its proposal on the same day it adopted conclusions on the enlargement process which contain multiple references to the central importance of the rule of law and the need for candidate countries to focus on and tackle related issues with determination, a determination which is however clearly lacking when it comes to the EU countries themselves.
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